



SUBMISSION

**ASSOCIATION OF
RETIRED COMMISSIONED OFFICERS**

WHITE PAPER - DEFENCE POLICY

OCTOBER 2013



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SUBMISSION

ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

WHITE PAPER - DEFENCE POLICY

FOREWORD

1. Transformation Since 2000

- a. The first White Paper on Defence provided the policy framework for the decade commencing in 2000. This policy framework encompassed national (domestic), regional and international defence and security environments. It provided the strategic basis for sustaining capability development, operational readiness, efficiency and effectiveness of the Defence Forces - Óglaigh na hÉireann. The White Paper also provided for the continuation of the Defence Forces significant transformation programme, consistent with the state of the public finances, coupled with the evolving defence and security situation.
- b. Substantial progress, especially in the areas of reform, downsizing, reorganisation, modernisation, barrack consolidation, capability development, devolved subheads, and value for money has been made by the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces in implementing the White Paper. The Strategic Management Committee, Office of Emergency Planning and the High Level Planning and Procurement Group are examples of areas of close collaboration between the civilian and military elements.
- c. In addition, enhanced capabilities enabled the Defence Forces to deploy units and personnel in challenging overseas environments such as Liberia, Chad, Uganda and Mali, and participate in the European Union's Battlegroups. Defence Forces and Department of Defence personnel augment the European Union Permanent Representation and the Europe-Atlantic Partnership Council (NATO's Partnership for Peace) Representation. Defence Forces personnel continue to augment Permanent Missions in the United Nations and OSCE, and at the European Union Military Staff. Defence Forces personnel have served on the United Nations Military Staff.
- d. As outlined in the Green Paper on Defence, greater efficiencies and enhanced effectiveness have been achieved since 2000 within the Defence Forces.
- e. In parallel, during the last decade, significant changes were witnessed in the regional and international defence and security environments, especially in the areas of perceived threats, early warning, security strategy, security architecture, and military and civilian responses to conflict prevention and crisis management. The realities arising from the Green Paper's defence and security assessment provide valuable parameters to formulate the White Paper.

In particular, the conclusion that “co-operative and collaborative security arrangements are deepening and that Ireland must remain an active participant in the evolving collective security response” merits due attention.

2. **White Paper - 2014.** The Association of Retired Commissioned Officers (ARCO) welcomes the Government's intention to publish a new White Paper in 2014. The development of this White Paper will provide the opportunity of formulating contemporary Defence Policy, based on prevailing and evolving environments. It is desirable that the White Paper ensures that an appropriate level of defence capability is available to meet the challenges facing Ireland and its Defence Forces over the next decade. ARCO fully endorses the process, including the publication of the Green Paper on Defence, as part of the broad consultative process, informing our nation's future Defence Policy.
3. **Consultative Process.** Following the publication of the Green Paper on Defence, ARCO invited submissions on the White Paper from its membership. This submission on the White Paper is endorsed by ARCO's Executive Committee, and reflects the views advanced by ARCO's members whose experience, knowledge and understanding can play an important role in this important process.

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

4. **Format of Submission.** As part of the related consultative process, ARCO welcomes the Minister's invitation to advance the views of its membership for consideration by the Government, the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces in the development of the White Paper. The format of ARCO's submission is as follows:
 - a. Part 1 - Introduction;
 - b. Part 2 – Political Dimension;
 - c. Part 3 – Defence and Security Environment;
 - d. Part 4 – Military Dimension;
 - e. Part 5 – Resource Dimension; and
 - f. Part 6 – Conclusions.
5. **Green Paper Policy Questions.** Whereas a wide range of issues are discussed within the submission, the following Policy Questions as outlined in the Green Paper will be addressed and appropriate recommendations will be proposed: Roles of the Defence Forces, Military Neutrality, Triple Lock Mechanism, Security Challenges, Operational Demands, and Capability Development.
6. **Reference Documents.** During the preparation of this submission, documents sourced included those listed in Annex 'A' attached.

7. **Defence Policy.** Defence is a core responsibility of a nation state. Defence Policy is an expression of the nation's intention to defend its sovereignty, safeguard its national interests and values, and contribute to international peace and security. Defence Policy, including its formulation, is informed, inter alia, by military advice. Relevant to the prevailing defence and security environment, Defence Policy provides: political control, strategic direction, consistency, assigns priorities, prescribes military capabilities and resources, and justifies the efficient and effective employment of military and civil defence capabilities to fulfil responsibilities assigned by Government. In addition, Ireland's Defence Policy, in association with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, informs national inputs into international policy, including the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy.
8. **United Nations, European Union and NATO.** Implementing a vast range of international obligations, Ireland remains a valued and influential member of the United Nations Organisation, a proactive Member State of the European Union, and active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace. Following on from the successful Presidency of the European Council in 2013, our international partners within the United Nations, the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace, will view with interest Ireland's Green Paper and the subsequent White Paper. Reinforcing Ireland's commitment to collective security and the United Nations Standby Arrangement will have a positive effect within the United Nations. Embracing within the White Paper, the objectives, structures, procedures, instruments and capabilities of the Common Security and Defence Policy will provide an enhanced national and regional understanding of Ireland's posture in European Union's security and defence affairs. Likewise, a further endorsement of the objectives of NATO's Partnership for Peace in the White Paper will be noted by Ireland's partners.
9. **Point of Departure.** ARCO, whose membership reflects a considerable reservoir of experience and expertise within the realm of defence, believes that Ireland's Defence Policy, independent of a military alliance, is to defend and secure Ireland's sovereignty, its territory, its citizens and its institutions, and to safeguard its national values and interests.
 - a. In this context, ARCO contends that in addition to the provision of a contingent all-arms conventional land, air and maritime defence capability at appropriate operational readiness, the Defence Forces must contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability, to collective security, and continue to provide Aid to the Civil Power, Aid to the Civil Authority, and support to Government Departments, Agencies and Local Authorities.
 - b. Accordingly, Ireland must demonstrate its willingness and its capability to defend the nation's territorial, political, economic and cultural integrity, with a credible all-arms conventional military force, as an instrument of Government Policy.
 - c. Whereas Defence requires a significant personnel and fiscal investment, ARCO submits that the force structure for the three components of the Permanent Defence Force, Army, Air Corps and Naval Service, must be relevant, fit for purpose and maintained at the minimum critical mass level.

- d. Likewise, continuity of a credible conventional operational capability and the associated professional military skills must be maintained within all components of the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force.
- e. Within the maritime domain, both the Air Corps and Naval Service have been assigned direct responsibility for maritime surveillance and policing, and for enforcement powers in relation to sea fisheries. This represents a Value for Money approach for the State in utilising these military assets in such roles. The total area of the Exclusive Economic Zone¹ is approximately four times the size of the island of Ireland and the extended maritime shelf, over which Ireland claims jurisdiction, covers an area of over one million square kilometres. The surveillance, security requirements and capacity to project a meaningful presence in this environment will be a major challenge for the three components of the Defence Forces.

PART 2 - POLITICAL DIMENSION

10. **Formulation and Execution of Defence Policy.** Democratic control over the Defence Forces is an absolute requirement in a democracy.
 - a. **Command.** Under the direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of the Defence Act, the military command of, and all executive and administrative powers in relation to, the Defence Forces, including the power to delegate command and authority, shall be exercisable by the Government and, subject to such exceptions and limitations as the Government may from time to time determine, through and by the Minister.
 - b. **Strategic Level.** At the strategic level², the Council of Defence and the Strategic Management Committee provide an effective and appropriate bridging mechanism between the formulation and execution of Defence Policy.
 - c. **External Departments.** In the prevailing economic, defence and security environments, a considerable number of issues within the realm of Defence Policy will also be addressed in the respective responses of other Government Departments.

¹ The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the zone immediately adjacent and beyond the territorial seas extending to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines. In the EEZ, Ireland has sovereign rights over the exploitation, conservation and management of living and non-living natural resources and exercises jurisdiction over marine scientific research and for the protection of the marine environment. Ireland declared an Exclusive Economic Zone in Part 3 of the Sea Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Act 2006.

² Politico-Military level.

- d. **Policy and Advice.** Within the Department of Defence, there are two streams for advice, namely civilian and military. The combining of these advices, coupled with other factors, enables policy formulation within the Department of Defence.
- (1) The respective roles of the appointment holders are guided by the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, the Public Service Management Act 1997, the Defence Acts and the White Paper 2000. The White Paper 2000 states that the Chief of Staff is the principal military advisor and the Secretary-General is the principal policy advisor. The same terminology is used to describe the role of the Secretary-General when the appointment was advertised in May 2013.
 - (2) The Green Paper does not alter the role of the Chief of Staff. However, the terminology in the description of the role of the Secretary-General has been altered and the Green Paper states that the Secretary-General is the principal defence policy advisor. There is no explanation given, nor is there an apparent reason for this change.
 - (3) ARCO is concerned that if this change should be made, it may inadvertently impinge on the role of the Chief of Staff. Given the valuable partnership work that has been undertaken within the Department since the publication of the White Paper in 2000, it could prove damaging to this important concept and also alter existing working arrangements. The Association is of the view that a more simplified description of the roles of the relative appointment holders is provided in the UK's Defence Ministry, whereby the main appointment holders' functions are described as principal civilian advisor and principal military advisor³.
- e. **Execution of Policy.** The execution of Defence Policy is achieved in the most effective and efficient manner when those responsible for the delivery of the associated objectives have control over the employment and management of the necessary resources. The Green Paper gives the impression⁴ that the "civil element" (Secretariat) solely or independently implements Defence Policy. Whereas the Secretariat has a key role in the implementation of Defence Policy, it should be noted that the execution of the military aspects of Defence Policy is primarily the responsibility of the Defence Forces.

11. **White Paper on Defence Policy.** While the White Paper on Defence published in 2000 was interpreted as a policy framework for Defence, rather than a document focussing on Defence Policy, the current process should facilitate the formulation of a National Defence Policy, from which defence strategies, including military

³ The UK's Permanent Under Secretary (Secretary-General's equivalent) is the government's principal civilian adviser on defence. The UK's Chief of the Defence Staff is the principal military adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence and the UK's Government, vide UK's Ministry of Defence website.

⁴ Vide paragraph 2.1 of the Green Paper

strategies, for the implementation of the policy can derive. Accordingly, the new White Paper should be titled – “Defence Policy White Paper – 2014”.

12. **Defence Posture.** Ireland’s current Defence Posture is independent of a military alliance, yet supportive of international and regional security cooperation. Ireland implements this posture in accordance with national and international law, and strictly adheres to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The White Paper provides an ample opportunity to prescribe Ireland’s future defence posture in the context of the nation’s prevailing position on collective security, military neutrality, the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace.
13. **Constitution.** It is not envisaged that an associated discussion on the White Paper would see a requirement to amend the Constitution regarding:
 - (1) Declaration of war;
 - (2) Common defence;
 - (3) Ireland’s devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality;
 - (4) The principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.
14. **Process of Reform.** The process of reform, transformation and reorganisation of the Defence Forces has evolved arising from the Gleeson Report - 1990, the Efficiency Audit Group Review - 1993, the Price Waterhouse Report -1994 and the Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan - 1999. The most recent reform within the Defence Forces was a reorganisation of the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps components, and the Army Reserve in 2012. All proposals regarding the reorganisation of the Defence Forces should be informed by military advice. Since the publication of the White Paper, a reduction of civil servants has occurred within the Department of Defence.
15. **Defence Partnership.** Since the publication of the White Paper 2000, the military and civilian elements of the Department of Defence have worked together on many projects with a high degree of success. ARCO welcomes this improved level of cooperation. In the White Paper 2000 a new term “Defence Organisation” emerged and was defined to describe this work⁵. ARCO believes that the term should be redefined in the forthcoming White Paper to ensure that the term is understood to describe tasks undertaken at working level and does not provide for an overarching body that has a governing function.
16. **Defence Goals.** Linked with Ireland’s security interests, in addition to the roles assigned to the Defence Forces, Defence Goals should be formally included in the White Paper. The Defence Goals should encompass: a commitment to national

⁵ The Green Paper defines “Defence Organisation” as the civil and military organisation.

sovereignty, a commitment to national security, a commitment to international security, a commitment to regional security, and a commitment to Government Departments, Local Authorities and Agencies. A commitment to national sovereignty, envisages that Ireland, independent of a military alliance, will militarily defend and secure its sovereignty, its territory, its citizens, its institutions, and safeguard its national interests. This would be achieved through a commitment to collective security, coupled with a combination of military deterrence and defence.

17. **Neutrality.** Whereas, Ireland declared a policy of neutrality during the Second World War, the country has never been ideologically neutral, or morally indifferent to major international security challenges. Neutrality, which has a strict legal basis, only applies in war. Some believe that neutrality is a political aspect of Ireland's sovereignty – a symbol of the country's uniqueness. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prescribe obligations associated with neutrality. A policy of neutrality is conditional on having an adequate defence capacity requiring substantial expenditure on organisation, infrastructure and equipment. Failure to maintain the capacity to implement the internationally prescribed neutrality provisions is a significant liability to national sovereignty. However, the maintenance of adequate military resources, outside of a military alliance, for both deterrence and defence, is financially unrealistic, especially with the absence of a conventional threat. Nevertheless, a defence posture requires a contingent capability of a credible all-arms, conventional based Defence Forces. As a diplomatic or military concept, "military neutrality", has no statutory basis.
 - a. **European Union.** The Treaty on European Union makes clear that the Union's security and defence policy shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of Member States. The National Declaration presented to the Seville European Council on 21 & 22 June 2002⁶ stated, inter alia, that Ireland will not adopt any decision taken by the European Council to move to a common defence, or ratify any future Treaty which would involve a departure from the traditional policy of "military neutrality", unless it has first been approved by the Irish people in a referendum.
 - b. **Security Values and Interests.** Citing cyber-security and terrorism, the Green Paper correctly states that "military neutrality" is immaterial for threats "that are generic and transnational in character". It should also be noted that the retention of a posture of "military neutrality" is not a prerequisite for advancing Ireland's core security values and interests such as: arms control, disarmament, human rights, rule of law, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, confidence-building, settlement of conflict by peaceful means, and a willingness to participate in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations.
 - c. **Collective Security.** Ireland should continue to support the concept of collective security based on international law through its active participation in international organisations especially the United Nations, the European Union

⁶ Annex 3, Presidency Conclusions, 13463/02, circulated to EU Delegations on 24 October 2002.

and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is envisaged for purely political reasons that Ireland will not become a “full member” of any military alliance, such as NATO, that involves an automatic obligation to come to the defence of an alliance partner.

- d. **Regional Cooperation and Security.** In addition to Ireland’s vigorous engagement with NATO through its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace framework, and participation with NATO-led Peace Support Operations, Ireland’s defence posture in the future, should also be served with its proactive involvement in defence arrangements within the European Union. In this context, a robust military capability will be required in support of regional cooperation and security involving the European Union and NATO, including any defence arrangements envisaged in the European Union Treaties under the Common Security and Defence Policy.
- e. **Common Defence.** In ratifying the Nice Treaty, a constitutional amendment prescribed, inter alia, that the State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence which would include Ireland, (vide Article 29.4.9). Nevertheless, Ireland continues to be actively engaged in the Common Security and Defence Policy. A modification of Defence Posture away from “military neutrality” is compatible with the Constitution and would consolidate Ireland’s position within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its common Security and Defence Policy.
- f. **Overseas Deployments.** The decision-making parameters associated with overseas deployments have little or no bearing on Ireland’s retention or modification of its “military neutrality” posture.
- g. **Non-alliance and Collective Security.** As the Green Paper correctly states: “there is a requirement for policy clarity.....which recognises the limitations of military neutrality.....”. There is a need to move forward and provide the optimum defence posture for peacetime and in times of war. Accordingly, in order to reflect on the security changes that have taken place both internationally and regionally, it is considered prudent to restate Ireland’s defence position in the White Paper:
 - (1) Moving away from the outdated and flawed concept of “military neutrality”; towards
 - (2) In peacetime, a posture of non-alliance and collective security, with full commitment with the United Nations, the European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace; and
 - (3) Falling back on article 28.3.1 and 28.3.2 of the Constitution in times of war.
- h. **Policy Question - Military Neutrality.** Therefore, in response to the question, how can Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality be “dovetailed with increasing requirements for Defence [Forces] participation in

collective security cooperation”, ARCO contends that Ireland’s defence posture should be in peacetime, a posture of non-alliance and collective security, with full commitment with the United Nations, the European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace; and falling back on article 28.3.1 and 28.3.2 of the Constitution in times of war. This should be reflected in the White Paper.

18. **International Deployments – Triple Lock Mechanism**

- a. **Overseas.** Defence Forces personnel are deployed overseas on operations such as Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping, Confidence and Security Building Measures, Disarmament and Arms Control, Training, and Support for Humanitarian Relief. Personnel are also serving on representative and military staffs in New York, Brussels, Mons and Vienna. Ireland has assigned 850 trained and equipped personnel to the United Nations Standby Arrangement System. Ireland also provides a palette of military all-arms capabilities to the European Union’s Headline Goal, including elements for European Union’s high readiness Battlegroups. In addition, Ireland’s involvement with Partnership for Peace envisages the provision of Defence Forces capabilities to NATO-led Peace Support Operations. It is envisaged that the White Paper 2014 will reflect these commitments to the United Nations, European Union and NATO. The new White Paper also provides the opportunity to clarify parameters associated with the decision-making process for overseas deployments.
- b. **Decision-Making Parameters.** Participation in overseas Peace Support Operations should remain a sovereign decision. Military advice associated with new missions should address parameters such as legitimacy, existing commitments, appropriate response, objectives, risk assessment, force protection, command and control, capabilities, resources, duration and endstate. Legislation provides that Dáil Éireann’s approval is required for the dispatch of a Defence Forces armed contingent, or an unarmed contingent of more than 12 personnel.
- c. **Legitimacy.** The aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations confer primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the United Nations Security Council. Ideally, all Peace Support Operations should derive their legitimacy from decisions of the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council. In recent times, under chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Regional Organisations such as the European Union and NATO have been authorised⁷ to conduct such operations.
- d. **National Declaration.** The National Declaration presented to the Seville European Council on 21 & 22 June 2002⁸, confirmed, inter alia, that Ireland

⁷ Article 53 of Chapter VIII uses the word “authorised” – not “mandated” as sometimes quoted in Department of Defence and Defence Forces documents.

⁸ Annex 3, Presidency Conclusions, 13463/02, circulated to EU Delegations on 24 October 2002.

will take a sovereign decision, on a case by case basis, on whether the Defence Forces should participate in humanitarian or crisis management tasks undertaken by the European Union, based on the triple lock of United Nations authorisation, Government decision and approval by Dáil Éireann.

- e. **Sovereign Decision.** Looking to the centenary of the Easter Rising, An Taoiseach Mr Enda Kenny T.D. stated on 28 July 2013 “to be a real republic, Ireland has to be a sovereign republic”. Deploying Defence Forces personnel and units overseas is a sovereign decision.
- (1) The associated national decision-making procedures should be within our sovereign competencies, informed but not determined by decisions taken by international organisations, regional organisations, or other nations. The Green Paper reflects on the importance of United Nations legitimacy of peacekeeping operations and questions if this position outweighs any disadvantages.
 - (2) ARCO fully endorses the view contained in the Green Paper that the requirement for United Nations authorisation “constitutes a self-imposed legal constraint on the State’s sovereignty in making decisions about its armed forces”. Nevertheless, ARCO does not hold the view that “there is substantial support for the Triple Lock Mechanism” as outlined in the Green Paper.
 - (3) The term ‘triple lock’ is in itself a contradiction in that a Government, which favours a deployment, will presumably use its majority in the Dáil to confirm their decision. Effectively, the only impediment restricting a Government decision is that which requires some form of United Nations authorisation. The United Nations limitation also implies that we accept the judgement of the United Nations Security Council as the ultimate arbiter of the legitimacy of a military deployment.
 - (4) Whereas legitimacy for the deployment of military force is essential both at home or overseas, such legitimacy should derive from national and international legislation, including the Constitution, Defence Acts, the United Nations Charter and International Humanitarian Law.
 - (5) The inclusion of United Nation’s authorisation in the Triple Lock Mechanism undermines national sovereignty and inhibits the Defence Forces from fully participating in peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian operations.
 - (6) The sovereign decision should be informed by advice from Government Departments, including Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Chief of Staff’s military advice, and made by the Government and Dáil Éireann, according to Ireland’s national interests, values and security needs. This process naturally would include an analysis of any decision made by the United Nations Security Council, United Nations General Assembly, or the European Council.

- f. **United Nations Authorisation.** Authorisation from the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council is highly desirable in all cases for military action for overseas operations. However, within the Security Council, this authorisation is determined by the national interests and values of the Council's members. In particular, each of the five permanent members could veto authorisation, and thereby block the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, or veto the authorisation of a Regional Organisation, (European Union, NATO, African Union), to conduct the operation⁹. Under the Triple Lock Mechanism, this situation would preclude the Irish Government and Dáil Éireann from authorising the deployment of Defence Forces units or personnel in excess of 12 on overseas Peace Support Operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian or evacuation operations.
- g. **Regional Organisations.** The vigorous decision-making procedures within the European Union and NATO, endorsed by politically elected representatives, do not include United Nations authorisation for the deployment of peacekeeping, crisis management or humanitarian operations.
- (1) Unlike the United Nations, both the European Union and NATO have robust crisis management procedures as part of their formal decision-making apparatus.
 - (2) Unlike the United Nations, formal decisions for the deployment of military operations are made by politically elected representatives at Head of State, Head of Government, or Government Minister level.
 - (3) Unlike the United Nations, the European Union's Political and Security Committee, consisting of diplomatic representatives of Member States, exercise political control and strategic direction of all military and civilian operations.
 - (4) Unlike the United Nations, the European Union and NATO's Military Committees are active forums, provide military advice and exercise military control over all military operations.
- h. **Spectrum of Peace Support Operations.** The Treaty of the European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, has expanded the range of Peace Support Operations from the original scope of the Petersberg Tasks.
- (1) **Tasks.** The tasks involving civilian and military means, contained in Article 28 A (1), include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. The Article also states that these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism,

⁹ The Irish Times editorial of 19 July 2013 states: "Is it right that a Chinese veto should be able to block an Irish military mission that would otherwise have the support of the rest of the world's community? But this is a hook we have hoisted ourselves upon".

including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

- (2) **Rapid Deployable Operations.** Evacuation Operations are one such type of Peace Support Operation catering for the rapid withdrawal of European and non-European personnel from a crisis area. It is likely that such evacuees could include Irish nationals. The associated timeframe may not allow for United Nations authorisation, and such is not a prerequisite for European Union Action. In such circumstances, with the current Triple Lock Mechanism, a unit or element of the Defence Forces, (e.g. Army Ranger Wing, Air Corps Aircraft, or Naval Service Ship), could be precluded from supporting the rapid evacuation of Irish nationals. A limited timeframe is also required for the rapid deployment of European Union Battlegroups, which may not be sufficient for a United Nations authorisation.
- i. **Policy Question – The Triple Lock Mechanism.** The advantages to the State in retaining the Triple Lock Mechanism, in particular in ensuring the international legitimacy of Peace Support Operations, do not merit the retention in its present format with the inclusion of the present clause pertaining to United Nations authorisation. Based on the above analysis, ARCO contends that this clause should be deleted from the mechanism, or alternatively modified to incorporate United Nations or European Union authorisation¹⁰.

PART 3

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

19. **Assessment.** ARCO, based on its members' experiences and expertise, advances some realistic observations on the threat environment, and the optimum Defence Forces capabilities required in light of the national and international situation.
 - a. **Unpredictable.** As stated in the Green Paper, the real threat is the unpredictable.
 - (1) **Landscape.** The Green Paper correctly endorses the fact that threats to “the European Union, to European interests and to the wider security are now threats to Ireland”.

¹⁰ Note: the term “authorisation” is sometimes incorrectly replaced with the word “mandated”. As in the UN Charter and the Seville Declaration – the term “authorisation” should be used rather than “mandated”.

- (2) **Potential Threats.** Potential national, regional and international threats include¹¹: activists' turbulence and destructive power, asymmetric threat, change in extension or reduction of European Union membership, chemical pollution, chronic and infectious disease, collapse of capitalism, competition for scarce natural resources, cyber and electromagnetic attacks, extremism, focused cultures, food contamination, food sabotage, global warning, interstate migration, intrastate conflict, intrastate war, nuclear exchange between two or more nations, organised crime, piracy, poverty, rebalancing of global power, regional conflict, subversive endeavours, state failure, sustained economic downturn, terrorism, weak governance, and weapons of mass effect.
- b. **Terrorism.** Terrorism will remain a key security challenge. It will become more asymmetric, widespread, extreme, international and autonomous, with access to increasingly sophisticated instruments and weaponry, requiring effective intelligence, communications, surveillance, protection and special operations (Army Ranger Wing) capabilities.
- c. **Middle East and Africa.** The Middle East and Africa will remain regions of concern for Ireland, with continued tension between States, within States, Europe's reliance on Gulf oil, and the challenges associated with weak governance, hunger, poverty and disease.
20. **Readiness to Respond.** The greatest risk to Ireland is that the national or international environment will change faster than the Government can obtain the capacity and capabilities associated with its political, economic and military instruments of power, to address a threat to the nation's sovereignty or national interests. Early warning systems, effective analysis, robust decision-making procedures, operational readiness, evaluation of security resources, and prudent investment in capability development are required.
21. **National Environment.** The likelihood of interstate conflict within Europe remains low. Nevertheless, a certain level of threat exists to the State's security arising from a potential terrorist attack, or major emergency incident.
- a. The resort to lethal violence by nonconformists, including criminals, remains the definite instrument of achieving influence. Ireland must retain a credible military conventional capability to demonstrate its determination to defend its sovereignty and safeguard its national interests, through the medium of regional security cooperation, deterrence and defence.
- b. Likewise, Óglaigh na hÉireann must retain its non-conventional capability to support An Garda Síochána in its response to subversive activity and sporadic terrorist activities. The expansion of the State's jurisdiction encompassing the

¹¹ Perceived threats listed alphabetically.

continental shelf, coupled with engagement in counter narcotic operations, present intelligence, air and maritime operational challenges for the Defence Forces.

- c. In addition, the Defence Forces must retain appropriate capabilities to support Government Departments and Agencies, and appropriate competencies to play an active role in the Office of Emergency Planning and the National Emergency Coordination Centre.

22. International Environment

- a. It is envisaged that Ireland will continue to depend on NATO's collective defence, including the active involvement of the United States of America in this alliance, to shield against any strategic threat to the State.
- b. Contemporary security challenges as already mentioned include terrorism, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure and organised crime. These challenges require international and regional organisations to respond using a comprehensive approach involving all instruments of power: political, diplomatic, military, humanitarian and economic. Organisations and nations have to enhance systems of early warning, collective security, intelligence exchange, interoperability, security cooperation, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution.
- c. In the international arena, United Nations authorisation will remain desirable to sanction military intervention. However, veto on Resolutions by members of the Security Council could seriously undermine the United Nations efforts for conflict prevention, crisis management, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, leading to stalemate and inaction.
- d. The Defence Forces must retain a robust all-arms capability in order to make credible contributions to the United Nations, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO's Partnership for Peace.
- e. Future overseas deployments will require the Defence Forces to operate in complex multi-dimensional, political, ethnic, cultural and geographical environments. In addition to contemporary operations, these deployments could include stabilisation operations, security sector reform, humanitarian intervention and evacuation, all requiring an extensive range of conventional and non-conventional military capabilities.
- f. The required capabilities will include the capacity for strategic analysis, early warning, strategic and operational planning, military advice, effective intelligence resources, deployable military assets, effective force protection, sustainable operational lift, efficient logistics, and appropriate command and communications.

23. **Military Environment.** Notwithstanding the worldwide transformation of military assets, including downsizing, armed forces are constantly enhancing their land, air and maritime capacities and capabilities.
- a. Capability gaps between the Defence Forces and the armed forces of other nations engaged in multi-dimensional peace support operations must be minimised. The threat to such joint and combined operations¹² will require enhanced interoperability, protection, survivability, mobility, communications, command and control, and sustainability.
 - b. Contemporary military innovations and derived defence systems should lead to enhanced military capabilities for the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces should exploit its lead capability in areas such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and be fully engaged in initiatives such as the National Maritime College, hazard prediction analysis, and the Irish Maritime and Energy Cluster.
24. **Policy Questions - Security Challenges & Capability Requirements.** As outlined in the above section, "Security and Defence Environment", there are numerous security challenges and associated capability requirements, in addition to those listed in the Green Paper, which should be considered in the White Paper.

PART 4 - MILITARY DIMENSION

25. **Defence Forces Roles.** The Green Paper notes that the outputs of the Defence Forces¹³ form "an integral part of a multinational defence, security and support framework". The Defence Forces will continue to engage in a wide range of activities and deliver substantial outputs in both the national and international arenas.
- a. **Proposed Roles.** The White Paper 2014 provides the opportunity to restate the roles of the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces roles should cover four fundamental areas: national sovereignty, national security, international and regional security, and support to Government Departments and Local Authorities. The roles must allow the Defence Forces to react to any emerging defence or security challenge. The proposed roles are outlined below.
 - (1) **National Sovereignty.** To provide for the military defence of the State, by providing a force structure that demonstrates a peacetime commitment to national defence and which forms the basis for responding to serious changes in the defence and security environment.

¹² Doctrinally "joint" means two or more components (land, air or maritime), "combined" means two or more nations.

¹³ The term "Defence Organisation" is used rather than Defence Forces and the Department of Defence including Civil Defence.

- (2) **National Security**. To contribute to the internal security of the State by providing Aid to the Civil Power when requested to An Garda Síochána, who have primary responsibility for law and order, including the protection of the internal security of the State.
 - (3) **International and Regional Security**. To participate in multinational Peace Support Operations in support of the United Nations, under United Nations mandate, including Regional Peace Support Operations authorised by the United Nations or European Union.
 - (4) **Support to Government Departments and Local Authorities**. To provide military support to Government Departments and Local Authorities, including the provision of the State's principal seagoing agency, fishery protection services, maritime surveillance, policing and security, maritime search and rescue support, diving support, pollution prevention and response, and Health Service Executive air support on a mutually agreed basis.
- b. **Ranking of Roles**. Whereas there may be pressure to change the ranking of the roles, e.g. placing national sovereignty – defence of the nation as the third or fourth role, such a change is not advocated at this time.
 - c. **Policy Question – Roles**. Whereas the future operational demands on the Defence Forces will change as outlined in this submission, only minor changes in the Roles as defined in the 2000 White Paper are envisaged.
26. **Capabilities**. The Defence Forces require a comprehensive range of land, air and maritime capabilities for conventional defence, territorial responsibilities, internal security, peace support operations, and governmental support, including support to civil authorities. Capability evaluation is a continuous process.
- a. Such military capabilities should provide a combination of enabling factors such as: mobility, fire support, protection, intelligence, command and control, interoperability, deployability and sustainability.
 - b. The capability requirement is the associated unit, equipment, platform or resource required to deliver the components of the specific capability. The identification of required military capabilities should be informed by the evolving defence and security environment, resource allocation including personnel and finance, and military advice.
 - c. The Green Paper refers to the combined efforts of “both civil and military” in the development of military capability. The lead in developing military capabilities should be the Defence Forces.
 - d. The White Paper should emphasise the further development of key capabilities listed in the Strategy Statement 2011 - 2014, including: Intelligence Functions; Special Operations; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN);

Counter Improvised Explosive Device Measures; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR).

- e. The Defence Forces uses eight different elements for capability development. The elements are: Doctrine, Organisation, Training and Education, Material, Facilities, Personnel, Leadership and Interoperability. While the development of many of these elements is exclusive to the Defence Forces, a number of them are developed in partnership with the civilian side of the Department of Defence, such as the acquisition and development of material and facilities.
- f. The White Paper should emphasise the significant role that the European Defence Agency has on Defence Forces capability development and equipment procurement. Ireland's participation in initiatives such as the Defence Agency's Research and Technology Joint Investment Project on Force Protection, and the Agency's CBRN Programme and Maritime Surveillance project should be highlighted.
- g. Within the European Union, the Pooling and Sharing initiative is paying dividends in the area of capability shortfalls and subsequent cooperation between Member States. For example, since January 2012, Ireland is taking the lead in a Defence Agency project, which is reviewing naval training across the eleven participating Member States, seeking to deliver value for money through reducing duplication. In an environment of reduced financial resources, the Defence Forces would benefit from participation in appropriate Pooling and Sharing projects such as intelligence, cyber security, surveillance, reconnaissance, procurement, aircrew training, medical, strategic lift and logistics. The White Paper should expand the Defence Forces involvement in the Pooling and Sharing initiative.
- h. Likewise, the role of NATO's Partnership Goals in capability development to international standards should also be included in the White Paper.
- i. In the same context, the White Paper should embrace the Operational Capability Concept, under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace concept for Operational Capability, which provides an international assessment tool to measure capability development and to benchmark operational readiness.
- j. Regarding capabilities, the Green Paper's references to initiatives such as partnerships with industry, and new modes of procurement merit favourable consideration.
- k. The Defence Forces have seamlessly engaged in elements of civil-military cooperation that is delivering a Value for Money set of services. Both the Air Corps and Naval Service have direct responsibility for maritime surveillance and policing, and have enforcement powers as sea fishery protection officers. The Naval Service operates the 24/365 Fishery Monitoring Centre on behalf of the State. The Naval Service has successfully partnered with Cork Institute of Technology in developing and running the National Maritime College and separately the Irish Maritime and Energy Cluster. In the area of drug

interdiction, the Naval Service has partnered with the An Garda Síochána and Customs Service in developing the Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force. These partnerships highlight efficiencies that can be achieved in delivering services that are not otherwise available outside of the Defence Forces. In this context, the White paper should identify further synergies that might constitute a more integrated approach to maritime management, surveillance and security.

1. **Policy Question - Capability Requirements.** As outlined in the above paragraph on Capabilities, and in other paragraphs within the submission, new capabilities will be required by the Defence Forces and options such as Pooling and Sharing should be included in the White Paper. Likewise, NATO's Partnership for Peace Partnership Goals and Operational Capability Concept should be exploited for enhanced capability development and operational readiness.

27. **Cooperation with An Garda Síochána.** Within the domestic security environment, and the evolving capability developments, especially in areas such as armed response, and intelligence collection, evaluation and dissemination, the White Paper should cater for enhanced unity of effort and the efficient coordination of assets.

- a. The White Paper should not provide for military capabilities, which fall under the remit of police capabilities and vice-versa. An exception is those capabilities, such as Public Order Response, which may be required on some types of Peace Support Operations. The Green Paper refers to intelligence "led"¹⁴ responses to threats such as "terrorism, drug smuggling and organised crime". The collection and evaluation of military intelligence should be primarily focussed on issues requiring a military response, or direct military support such as defence, terrorism, subversion, force protection, maritime surveillance and policing, and security of resources (e.g. personnel, installations both on land and offshore, information, and communications).
- b. The White Paper should reinforce the continued requirement for the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps to provide support for Aid to the Civil Power including Security Operations, Cash Escorts, Prisoner Escorts, Engineer Special Search Teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and the provision of a Military Guard in Portlaoise Prison.

28. **Force Structure.** The Defence Forces must possess a core defence capability on a contingent basis, for all three components, capable of expansion to appropriate force levels if required for mobilisation. The force structure, coupled with its associated doctrine, training, education and equipment, must be maintained and sustained at the appropriate critical mass level and operational readiness.

¹⁴ The correct term is "intelligence based" not "led"

- a. **Critical Mass.** An appropriate critical mass for the three components of the Defence Forces is required to provide the military capacity to accomplish assigned roles; to provide for an effective and efficient organisation; representing best defence value for money; to provide a credible military deterrent and appropriate response to all defence and security eventualities; to sustain overseas deployments; to provide sufficient resources to maintain an all-arms capability and interoperability between the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps; to sustain collective training; and to provide a force nucleus for expansion or mobilisation.
- b. **Army Component.** The all-arms brigade structure provides the fundamental organisation for the Army component. Whereas three brigades were deemed necessary for critical mass in the 2000 White Paper, anything less than two brigades would undermine the span of command and control, and inhibit the maintenance of the operational capacity both at home and overseas, and the further development of the Army component.
- c. **Naval Service Component.** As the State's principal seagoing resource, the Naval Service's critical mass should remain with a flotilla of at least eight high endurance patrol vessels, providing the necessary maritime capabilities for the conventional role, the constabulary role and the agency role. These roles include defending territorial seas, safeguarding Ireland's maritime interest, provision of specialist diving teams, support to the Army component, deterring intrusive or aggressive acts, conducting maritime surveillance, maintaining an armed naval presence, supporting drug interdiction, ensuring right of passage, pollution monitoring, pollution response, pollution control, and protecting marine assets.
 - (1) The White Paper should identify further opportunities for inter departmental cooperation in order to fully exploit the capability of the Department of Defence and the Naval Service, to provide the spectrum of maritime functions that can loosely be classified as coast guard functions as defined in certain other jurisdictions. This support could also extend to enhanced use of naval dockyard facilities to support other State services and the possible integration of support and training of Irish Coast Guard volunteers in parallel with the Naval Reserve.
 - (2) In the international environment, Naval Service ships should continue to be used as platforms for promoting Irish Economic interests in conjunction with the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, and bodies such as Enterprise Ireland. The White Paper should reinforce the successful model of civil military cooperation that has been the hallmark of the outputs of the Naval Service.
- d. **Air Corps Component.** As the Defence Forces air component, the Air Corps provides for the military air defence of Ireland's airspace. The capabilities associated with airpower required by the Defence Forces remain air combat, maritime air cover, air transport, tactical air, and ground support. The critical mass for the Air Corps consists of a training – light strike squadron, a medium lift helicopter squadron, a training / utility lift helicopter squadron, a maritime

squadron, a transport squadron and a fixed wing reconnaissance squadron, equipped as appropriate with fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. Additional roles include Ministerial Air Transport, Garda Air Support, Search and Rescue (including Combat Search and Rescue) and Air Ambulance.

- (1) Air Corps helicopter support to the Defence Forces has been further enhanced following delivery of the new fleet and is now considered mature enough to extend its support to the Defence Forces engaged on duty overseas.
- (2) Should an appropriate platform be made available, the Air Corps possess' the skills, expertise, and experience to enable it to provide a strategic airlift capability to the Defence Forces to move troops and equipment to and from mission areas, in a cost-effective manner.

e. **Units and Elements.** The Force Structure should also cater for units and elements such as the Army Ranger Wing, Defence Forces Headquarters CIS Company, the Equitation School, Defence Forces School of Music, Medical Unit, Emergency Planning, Overseas Establishment, Representative Associations' Staffs and the Military Judge.

29. **Force Organisation.** The Defence Forces should be organised on conventional military lines in accordance with proven international doctrine and practice, and consist of Army, Naval Service and Air Corps components. Force design must carefully balance the mix of capabilities required within the Defence Forces. Despite the reduced resource envelope, the force organisation consisting of a Defence Forces Headquarters, the Permanent Defence Force, the Defence Forces Training Centre, and a Reserve Defence Force should be retained. ARCO notes the recent reorganisation of the Defence Forces arising from the Government's decision to reduce to two brigades, and the parallel reorganisation of Defence Forces Headquarters, the Defence Forces Training Centre and the Army Reserve.
30. **Permanent Defence Force.** In the current fiscal climate, ARCO notes the Government's decision in 2011 arising from the Comprehensive Review of Expenditure in 2011, that the strength of the Permanent Defence Force will be retained at 9,500 personnel, and that no further cuts are envisaged. ARCO contends that any further reduction in the authorised strength would seriously compromise the operational readiness, capacity to conduct overseas service, and the military effectiveness of the Defence Forces.
31. **Reserve Defence Force.** Arising from the reorganisation of the Army component and the Value for Money Review, the White Paper should provide for the future of the Reserve Defence Force. Due consideration should be afforded to amalgamate the current First Line Army and First Line Naval Service with the Army Reserve and Naval Reserve respectively. The Reserve Defence Force should be retained with both Army and Naval Service personnel, with full integration of reservists into Permanent Defence Units, rather than separate reserve units. Permanent Defence Units with integrated Army Reserve subunits should optimise the benefits accruing from reservists. The Reserve Defence Force should retain its focus on

augmenting the Permanent Defence Force. More emphasis should be placed on the high-technical skills available within the Reserve Defence Force.

32. **National Deployment.** Regarding the deployment of the Permanent Defence Force, a reasonable distribution of resources within and outside urban areas is desirable. The recent reorganisation of the Army component incorporated a viable deployment of units within the two brigades' areas of operations.
33. **Overseas Deployment.** To fulfil its overseas role, the Defence Forces must retain the required capability development and operational readiness, especially in the areas of leadership, interoperability, protection, firepower, mobility, communications, survivability, equipment, training, education and sustainability.
- a. The scope of overseas deployments in the White Paper should move from the traditional cohort of "peacekeeping, crisis management, humanitarian operations" and should be expanded to embrace areas falling under the remit of the Common Security and Defence Policy and prescribed in paragraph 28 A (1) of the European Treaty.
 - b. The palette of forces committed to the European Union's Headline Goal 2010, involving a range of all-arms capabilities at varying readiness states, should be retained and provide the basis of capability development and operational readiness.
 - c. Ireland's participation in Partnership for Peace should be maintained, including the Planning and Review Process and the Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme, enhancing the Defence Forces capability development to international standards, interoperability, and its capacity to deploy in NATO led United Nations authorised Peace Support Operations.
 - d. The reduction in personnel strength and the high rotation of specialist personnel will require mandatory selection, which should be fully appreciated by all quarters.
 - e. In addition to deployed units and staffs to overseas missions, the Defence Forces should continue to provide competent personnel to military delegations and military staffs within the United Nations, European Union, Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe, and NATO. Likewise, the provision of a limited and focussed number of Defence Attachés, in particular on a reciprocal basis, should be actively explored.
 - f. In addition to sustaining Defence Forces overseas units, Naval Service and Air Corps capabilities, including air and maritime platforms, should be deployed on overseas missions in their own right, in support of a Defence Forces overseas element or unit, or as a Force Headquarters resource as part of an international force.
 - g. Regarding Peace Support Operations, the overarching objective of having a battalion size unit deployed overseas must be retained.

- (1) Defence Forces battalion size units are the proven vehicle for command and control, cohesion, survivability, safety and mission effectiveness.
 - (2) To enable effective command, control and communications, the basic force structure of such a unit must consist of appropriate combat elements, combat support elements, combat service elements, coupled with the necessary protection, sustainability and command assets, in order to successfully achieve its assigned mission.
- h. The capability of deploying early entry enabling forces, and deploying units and staffs within a multinational force headquarters should be maintained.
 - i. Peace Support Operations require the acceptable degree of interoperability within the Defence Forces. They provide a benchmark to evaluate Defence Forces operational readiness and capabilities. In addition, such deployments expose personnel to United Nations, European Union and NATO Partnership for Peace concepts and procedures. Overseas service reinforces the need for capabilities providing effective life support in theatre and the requirement for family support at home.
34. **Education and Training Development.** The obligation for the Defence Forces to plan, train, equip and prepare for military operations both at home and overseas overrides all other functions in peacetime. Education and training play a key role in achieving this requirement. In this context, the Defence Forces must continue to enhance its educational and training programmes, and skills to meet the demands of a contemporary military force.
- a. **Education.** Education is a fundamental component of career development. It should be based on the concept of producing leaders with the mental agility and professional skills to deliver a broad range of capabilities throughout the spectrum of military operations.
 - (1) Military and civilian education should continue to be provided for all ranks at the appropriate time associated with career progression. The Defence Forces education process should be based on a progressive multi-level system from Junior Leadership to Senior Level Leadership, encompassing the tactical, operational and strategic levels in peace, conflict and war.
 - (2) Education in the European Union's Defence College, NATO's Training College and on courses conducted by other armed forces and civilian institutions, should focus on augmenting Defence Forces military education, and attaining its education objectives. The White Paper should reinforce the successful partnerships developed with higher level educational institutions.
 - (3) Naval Service non-military education and training requirements are provided at the National Maritime College. The White Paper should reinforce the successful education partnership developed between the Department of Defence, the Naval Service and Cork Institute of Technology in operating and managing the National Maritime College.

The acknowledgement should note that the partnership provides an example of synergies that can be obtained from an integrated approach to developing the State's maritime interests.

- b. **Training.** Operational readiness should be maintained through challenging, realistic and robust individual and collective training, thus enhancing capability development. The training benefits accruing from NATO's Partnership for Peace and the European Union's Battlegroups should be further exploited. To address future challenges, the Defence Forces must conduct ongoing reviews of its military doctrine, training skills and education, and modernise its training and educational equipment and resources. Appropriate training resources must be assigned to the Defence Forces supporting Memoranda of Understanding, Service Level Agreements, and responsibilities associated with Aid to the Civil Power and Aid to the Civil Authorities.
 - c. **Accreditation.** The range of education and training provided to students of all ranks in military establishments and the standards attained, continue to merit national and international graduate and post graduate qualifications, such as the Masters Degree awarded to successful graduates of the Command and Staff Course. The Defence Forces must continue to maintain academic partnerships with suitable external academic institutions.
35. **Associations.** The Department of Defence and the Defence Forces should continue to provide appropriate support to representative associations RACO and PDFORRA, and recognised veteran associations: ARCO, ONET and IUNVA. The veteran associations have good relations with each other and with the Department of Defence. Effective exchange of information, coupled with informal and formal meetings take place between ARCO, ONET and IUNVA, enhancing mutual support and understanding. ARCO avails of its website to provide timely information to its members, including information provided by the Department of Defence. ARCO holds the view that the new White Paper presents an opportunity to outline a framework to develop a veterans' strategy. As such, ARCO recommends that such a strategy be developed and form part of the White Paper.
36. **Heritage.** Óglaigh na hÉireann has a responsibility for the preservation of Ireland's military heritage, culture, traditions and associated amenities. In addition to the Permanent Defence Force, personnel enlisting in both the Army Reserve and Naval Service Reserve enhance military heritage in local communities. The Defence Forces should continue to locate and acquire artefacts, archives and memorabilia not currently in the nation's possession, for exhibition and reference in the Military Archives, the National Museum, or other appropriate Defence Forces locations. The Defence Forces School of Music continues to actively sustain Ireland's musical heritage. Support and assistance should continue on a national and local basis for appropriate commemorations. Likewise, the Department of Defence should maintain its active support of the Military Heritage of Ireland Trust.

PART 5 – RESOURCE DIMENSION

37. **Personnel.** The challenge for the Defence Forces is to attain, sustain and retain a well-motivated, loyal, effective and disciplined body of men and women, in an environment conducive to best practice Human Resource Management.
- a. Personnel are essential elements of capability development and the delivery of outputs. They have the right to be treated fairly with appropriate remuneration, including pensions, and conditions of service. Personnel should be provided with the resources and leadership to serve their country, developing their full potential as professional soldiers, sailors, airmen and women.
 - b. Early retirement ages and relatively short career terms of engagement in the Defence Forces, contrast with virtually all other forms of public service employment. The White Paper should provide for the framework for a successful return to civilian life at various retirement ages. Consequently, military education and training can act as an economic asset and as an important source of skills in the workplace.
 - c. The figure strength of 9,500 for the Permanent Defence Force as prescribed in the 2011 Comprehensive Review of Expenditure should be retained. The policy of continuous, regular recruitment of cadets and enlisted personnel, including technicians, should continue up to the authorised strength.
 - d. For its part, the Defence Forces must provide well educated and highly trained personnel with rewarding and challenging careers. Best practice Human Resource Strategies, including career management, are essential for success. Transparency and communications should be enhanced within the areas of Partnership, and Conciliation and Arbitration.
38. **Equipment.** The Defence Forces must continue to acquire, maintain and manage modern equipment, platforms, weapons and ammunition at the appropriate level of operational readiness in a cost effective manner.
- a. The Defence Capability Framework is a feasible instrument for the equipment investment programme for the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps. Appropriate emphases should be afforded to appropriate capabilities and enhancement of joint interoperability.
 - b. As part of its capability development programme, the Defence Forces must continue to engage with the European Defence Agency and NATO's Partnership Goals.
 - c. Arising from its vast technical and tactical experiences at home and abroad, the Defence Forces should be more actively involved with the private sector in the area of innovation, and research and development. In a similar train, Irish based companies should be actively encouraged to research, develop and provide equipment for the needs of the Defence Forces.

39. **Property.** The consolidation of the Defence Forces formations into a lesser number of locations remains a key objective in the modernisation programme as outlined in the White Paper on Defence.
- a. Since 1998, 14 military barracks have closed, with €84 million accruing from the sale of former barracks to date. The recent consolidation programmes allows the operational capacity of the Defence Forces to be maintained, notwithstanding the fall in authorised strength and a reduced financial allocation. Gains accruing from the disposal of surplus property must continue to be ring-fenced for equipment and infrastructure investment.
 - b. Refurbishment and maintenance programmes for retained property and training lands, together with living accommodation should occur until the appropriate standards are achieved.
40. **Funding.** Expenditure on Defence involves a significant commitment of public financial resources. However, the Defence Vote decreased in real terms since the publication of the White Paper 2000.
- a. The Green Paper records that as a percentage of Government expenditure and of Gross National Product, defence expenditure has decreased from 2.9% to 1.6% and from 0.85% to 0.70% respectively. Ireland has the second lowest expenditure on Defence within the European Union.
 - b. Ireland has assumed a degree of risk through its decision to limit resources, (including financial and personnel), allocated to the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces must be prepared to assume risk in shaping its organisation and capabilities.
 - c. There is a constant need to prioritise military capabilities in the context of defence funding and the prevailing security environment. Understanding the economic environment, the Defence Forces should continue to seek efficiencies throughout its activities, maximising available finances for equipment and infrastructure investment programmes, in order to retain capability development programmes and fulfil assigned roles.
 - d. Affordable and sustainable investment programmes are required that will allow the Defence Forces to remain effective and relevant into the future. The ratio of 70:30 between pay and non-pay expenditure should be a White Paper objective.

PART 6 - CONCLUSIONS

41. **Transformation.** Since the publication of the White Paper on Defence, significant organisational reform, transformation and modernisation has taken place within the Defence Forces. The substantial culture of change has led to

improved capabilities, efficiencies, and effectiveness in the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps, delivering impressive national and international outputs with limited scarce resources and value for money. The Defence Forces is hailed as a model for public service reform. In response to the revised strength ceiling of 9,500, a major re-organisation of the Defence Forces has encompassed a reduction in the number of Army Brigades from three to two. The challenge in the years to come will be to sustain the required military capabilities within a reduced resource envelope.

42. **Defence Policy.** The Defence Forces fulfils a unique role by providing policy options in the provision of a range of military capabilities for deployment at home and overseas. The White Paper provides the opportunity of prescribing Defence Policy which will ensure the sustainment of military capabilities and operational outputs, enabling the Defence Forces to fulfil its role assigned by Government and to meet evolving defence and security challenges.
43. **Summary.** ARCO welcomes the Minister's invitation to advance its views for consideration in the development of the White Paper. Those views have been presented in this written submission. For ease of reference, ARCO's key issues for consideration are as follows, reflecting the order as presented in the submission.

a. **Political Dimension**

- (1) **Defence Policy – Advice – Defence Organisation.** The White Paper should be titled: "Defence Policy White Paper". Regarding the provision of Ministerial Advice and the development of Defence Policy, the Secretary-General should be seen as the principal civilian advisor and the Chief of Staff the principal military advisor. The term "Defence Organisation" should be redefined in the White Paper.
- (2) **Goals - Triple Lock.** Defence Goals should be formally included in the White Paper. Ireland's defence position should be restated in the White Paper moving away from the outdated and flawed concept of military neutrality. The reference to United Nations authorisation should be deleted from the Triple Lock Mechanism, or alternatively modified to incorporate United Nations or European Union authorisation.

b. **Defence and Security Environment**

- (1) **Security Challenges.** There are numerous additional security challenges and associated capability requirements to those listed in the Green Paper, and these are outlined earlier in this submission. Terrorism remains a key security challenge. The Middle East and Africa are regions of concern.
- (2) **Required Capabilities.** Early warning, operational readiness and prudent investment in capability development are essential. Ireland must retain a credible military conventional capability to demonstrate its determination to defend its sovereignty and safeguard its national interests, through the

medium of regional security cooperation, deterrence and defence. A non-conventional capability is also required for Aid to the Civil Power and Aid to the Civil Authorities.

- (3) **Maritime Environment**. Maritime surveillance, policing and security, roles taking cognisance of the State's requirements in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the extended continental shelf,¹⁵ must be considered in the context of the most effective use of the Naval Service as the State's principal seagoing resource, and the Air Corps.

c. **Military Dimension**

- (1) **Roles – Capabilities – European Defence Agency – Partnership Goals**. The roles of the Defence Forces should be redefined in the White Paper. The White Paper should provide for evolving military capabilities. Appropriate emphasis should be made on the role of the European Defence Agency, including Pooling and Sharing, and NATO's Partnership Goals in addressing capability development and capability shortfalls. The White Paper should identify the continued requirement for the Defence Forces to provide appropriate support in Aid to the Civil Power and Aid to the Civilian Authorities.
- (2) **Force Structure – Reserve Defence Force – Attachés**. Óglaigh na hÉireann should continue to be structured on conventional military lines in accordance with proven international doctrine and practice. Force design should balance the mix of capabilities required by all three components – Army, Naval Service and Air Corps. The Reserve Defence Force should retain its focus on augmenting the Permanent Defence Force. The current First Line Army and First Line Naval Service should be amalgamated with the Army Reserve and Naval Reserve respectively. The provision of Defence Attachés, in particular on a reciprocal basis, should be actively explored.
- (3) **Operational Readiness – Overseas**. The Defence Forces must retain the required operational readiness in order to fulfil its overseas roles. In addition to Army capabilities, Naval Service and Air Corps capabilities and platforms should be made available for Peace Support Operations. Defence Forces battalion size units are the proven vehicle for command and control, survivability, cohesion, safety and mission effectiveness. The basic force structure for overseas service should be a battalion size unit, consisting of appropriate combat elements, combat support elements, combat service support elements and command and control elements.

¹⁵ Continental shelf is referenced in the UN Convention Law of the Sea. It can extend at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified circumstances.

- (4) **Education – Training – Veterans' Strategy**. To meet the demands of a contemporary military force, the importance of training and education cannot be overstated. Educational and training programmes must continue to play a key role. A veterans' strategy should be developed and form part of the White Paper.

d. **Resource Dimension**

- (1) **Personnel**. Supporting capability development and the delivery of outputs, the policy of continuous, regular recruitment and sustainment of well-motivated, educated and trained personnel up to the authorised strength of 9,500 for the Permanent Defence Force should be prescribed in the White Paper. The White Paper should provide for the framework for a successful return to civilian life at various retirement ages. Effective Human Resource Strategies, encompassing career management, transparency, communications and partnership are essential.
- (2) **Equipment**. An effective, value for money, procurement framework for contemporary defence equipment must be provided in the White Paper in order to support capability development. The framework should include recourse to the European Defence Agency and NATO's Partnership Goals. A proactive involvement with the private sector, especially within the remit of research and development, merits consideration.
- (3) **Property**. Refurbishment and maintenance programmes for retained property and training lands, together with living accommodation, should be implemented until the appropriate standards are achieved.
- (4) **Funding**. Military capabilities must be prioritised and efficiencies achieved in the context of defence funding and the prevailing security environment. Priority of available finances should focus on equipment and infrastructure investment programmes, in order to retain capability development programmes and fulfil assigned roles. The ratio of 70:30 between pay and non-pay expenditure should be a White Paper objective.

Association of Retired Commissioned Officers

October 2013

Reference Documents.

Annex A

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Documents sourced during the preparation of this submission, included those listed below:

Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924;
Bunreacht na hÉireann – Irish Constitution – 1937;
Efficiency Audit Group's Reports;
Review of the Defence Forces, Price Waterhouse – 1994;
Review of Air Corps and Naval Service, Price Waterhouse – 1998;
Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, Department of Foreign Affairs – 1997;
Defence Acts 1954 – 2011;
Public Service Management Act 1997;
White Paper on Defence 2000;
European Treaties;
European Security Strategy 2003;
European Union Council Conclusions 2004 - Headline Goal 2010;
Report on the Implementation of the White Paper - 2007;
Programme for Government 2011-2016;
National Recovery Plan, the Public Sector Reform Programme;
Public Service Agreement 2010-2014 (Croke Park Agreement);
EU Food for Thought Paper, Enhancing EU - UN Cooperation 2010;
United Kingdom's Defence and Security Review 2010;
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